In the q-ary online (causal) channel coding model, asender wishes to communieate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (Xl, ... , X n ) E {O, 1, ... , q -l}n symbol-by-symbol via a channel limited to at most pn errors (symbol changes) and p* n erasures. The channel is "online" (i.e., "causai") in the sense that at the ith step of communieation the channel decides whether to corrupt the ith symbol or not only based on its view of the symbols (Xl, ... , Xi). This is in contrast to the dassieal adversarial channel in which the corruption is chosen with full knowledge of the sent codeword x. In this work we extend the results obtained in [1]-[4] (in whieh the capacities of binary online bit~flip-only channels, and separately binary online erasure-only channels were characterized). We here extend those prior results in two important ways. First, we obtain the capacity of q-ary online channels for general q (rather than just q = 2). Second, we analyze combined error-erasure corruption models (rather than studying them separately). Characterization of this much broader dass of symmetrie online channels gives a fuller understanding of the effects of causality on jamming adversaries. The extensions in this paper require novel approaches for both optimal code designs, and matching information-theoretie converse arguments.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work studies adversarial causal (or online) channels. Specifically, asender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (Xl, ... , X n ) E {O, 1, ... ,q -l}n symbol-by-symbol via a channel that decides whether to corrupt the ith symbol or not based on its view so far, i.e., based only on the symbols (Xl, ... , Xi) transmitted thus far. This channel model is weaker than the omniscient adversarial model, e.g., [5] - [7] , in which the channel can be viewed as a malicious jammer that corrupts communication with full knowledge of the sent codeword x, and (roughly speaking) is stronger than the memoryless qary symmetric channel [8] , in which each symbol Xi of the transmitted codeword is replaced with a certain probability with a uniformly chosen symbol that differs trom Xi. l The causal adversarial model is an intermediate model between the two extremes, in which the channel decides whether or not to tamper with a particular symbol of the codeword based only on the symbols transmitted so far.
A line of work over the last decade has examined the capacity of causal channels. For binary alphabets, when I We say one channel is stronger than another if the first channel can mimic the behavior of the second one.
978-1-5090-1806-2/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE 915 the causal jammer is limited to pn bit flips, the capacity was upper bounded in [9] by min {I -H(p), (1 - 4p)+} and later an improved upper bound was given in [1] , [4] . A lower bound which slightly improves over the , [6] was given in [10] . Recently, a tight characterization of the capacity which matches the upper bound of [1] , [4] appeared in [3] . The binary causal adversarial erasure channel was studied in [2] , where an upper bound of 1-2p was presented along with a loose lower bound. The upper bound of 1 -2p was proven to be tight in [3] which characterized the capacity in this setting. For online channels over "Iarge alphabets" (of size that depend on the blocklegth n) in which the jammer may impose errors, [11] presents a complete capacity characterization of 1-2p, which is the same as the capacity with an omniscient adversary (attained by computationally-efficient Reed-Solomon codes, and impossibility of higher rates by the Singleton bound). This shows that the effect of causality diminishes with increasing alphabet size. Other related models incIude the study of AVCs, e.g., [12] , [13] (a model which includes that of the online channel), binary delayed adversaries [14] , [15] (in which the decision of whether or not to corrupt Xi depends only on (Xl, ... ,Xi-d) for a delay parameter d), computationally efficient coding schemes in the oblivious setting [16] , and adversarial "memoryless" channels where the jammer makes his decision to jam Xi or not based only on Xi [17] .
A. Our Results
In this work we extend the results obtained in [1] - [4] , [11] mentioned above in two important ways. First, we study the capacity of q-ary online channels (rather than binary channels) for any constant value of q. Second, we analyze combined error-erasure corruption models (rather than studying them separately). Specifically, the channel is limited to at most pn errors (symbol changes) and p*n erasures. We characterize the capacity of this channel as a function of the alphabet size q, error capability p, and erasure capability p*. To this end we propose and analyze an attack strategy similar to that for the binary case [1] , [2] , which gives an upper bound on the capacity, and a coding scheme similar to the one given in [3] , which implies a lower bound on the capacity matching our upper bound. Let q :;0. 2 be the (discrete) alpha- [5] , [6] , MRRW bound [7] , and 1 -H(p).
bet size. Let H q (x) be the q-ary entropy function, namely,
Our main result is Theorem 1.1 below.
The capa city C of the q-ary causal adversarial channel is
For other va lues of (p, p*) the capa city C is O.
Note: In Figure 1 we depict Thm 1.1 for some special cases:
• For q-ary causal erasure-only adversarial channels (p = 0) some capacities are shown in Figure l • A comparison of the capacity for q = 2, p* = 0, and general p with other known bounds is given in Figure 1 
PROOF TECHNIQUES
Due to space limitations, the technical details of our proof do not appear in this short 5-page abstract and appear entirely in the full version [18] . In wh at follows , we give the major high-level arguments in our converse/achievability proofs. To prove Theorem 1.1 we demonstrate two results: a converse (by analyzing an attack strategy similar to that presented in [1] , [2] , [4] ) and a coding scheme (that follows the lines of that presented in [3] ). Throughout, we denote the encoder by Alice, the decoder by Bob, and the adversarial causal jammer by Calvin. J) Converse: To prove no rate higher than C in Thm 1.1 is possible, we present a jamming strategy for Calvin that forces a positive and constant prob ability of decoding error whenever Alice and Bob communicate at rate higher than C, (no matter which encoding/decoding scheme is used by Alice and Bob). Calvin uses a two-phase babble-and-push strategy. In the first phase Calvin "babbles" by behaving like a q-ary symmetric channel in which pn symbols are changed in the first b symbols, and in the second phase, "pushes", as described below. In the first phase, Calvin only introduces errors (and does not erase). The length b of the babble phase is also chosen as a function of p.
In the second phase of n -b channel uses, Calvin randomly selects a "fake" codeword x' from Alice and Bob's codebook that is consistent with wh at Bob sees so fari.e some x' that from Bob's perspective may have been transmitted when taking into account Calvin's attack. Calvin then "pushes" the remainder of Alice's true codeword x towards x'. The push phase includes both errors and erasures imposed by Calvin. Specifically, Calvin first imposes an error (with probability 1/2) on every entry Xi of the true x that differs from the corresponding x~ in the fake x', changing Xi to X~. Once Calvin has exhausted his budget of pn errors, he then erases any entry Xi that differs from x~. If Calvin's p*n budget allows hirn to erase all such symbols, by symmetrization techniques (e.g., [1] ) we show that with constant probability Bob is unable to determine whether Alice transmitted x or x', causing a decoding error. For this attack to work, Calvin's remaining budget of errors and erasures must suffice to push the last nb symbols of x half the Hamming distance towards the last nb symbols of x'. Using the q-ary Plotkin bound [19] and some additional ideas, one can show that with constant probability the distance between x and x' on the last n -b locations is at most (1l/q)(n -b), implying that Calvin needs a remaining budget for the last nb channel uses in which the number of erasures plus twice the number of errors is at least (l-l/q)(n -b). Calculations show that for every p ::.; p there is a corresponding b for which Calvin's budget suffices for the push phase. However, one would like b to be "just long enough". If b is too smalI, the length (nb) of the push phase is "Iarge", and this increases the errorerasure budget needed by Calvin to overcome the potential distance of (1l/q)(n -b) between the suffixes of x and x'. Conversely, the larger the b, Bob's received vector looks "more similar" to the output of a random channel, resulting in a weaker outer bound. All in all, the threshold b is set to be the minimal value possible that still leaves Calvin with a sufficient "push" budget -hence the minimization over p in Thm 1.1. Given p, p*, q and p the parameter b is set to roughly a(p)n (specified in Thm 1.1) which implies that the babble phase behaves like a q-ary symmetric channel with error parameter PI a(p). Hence, the upper bound obtained in this case is the rate of the corresponding q-ary symmetric channel with block length b = a(p)n, which is exactly that stated in the term of Thm 1.1.
As we will see shortly in our achievability scheme, setting the rate just below the upper bound (for optimal p) allows us to overcome Calvin's pushing capabilities and as such allows successful communication, implying a tight characterization of the capacity for the model.
2) Achievability: In our codes, for each message Tn Alice uses private randomness (not known to Bob or Calvin) in the choice of x, designed to allow a high prob ability of successful communication for each Tn. We use "chunked random codes" described shortly. That is, we pick our codes uniformly at random from a random ensemble specified in Section lILA, and prove that w.h.p. over the code distribution a code chosen at random allows reliable communication. The decoder involves two major phases: a list decoding phase in which the decoder obtains a short list of messages that include the one transmitted, and a unique decoding phase in which the list is reduced to a single message. Roughly, Bob in his decoding process divides the received word into two parts -all symbols x = Xl, ... , Xt' receIVed up to a given time t*, and all symbols received afterwards (denoted xf, +1). The list decoding is done using the prefix x t ', and the process of unique decoding from the list is done using the suffix xf* +1 .
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Consider first the special case in which there are erasures only (p = 0). In this case, given the erasure parameter p* and the received word, the decoder Bob can pin-point the value of t* that allows successful list-decoding. Specifically, for any adversarial erasure pattern, we show the existence of a value t* that on one hand allows Bob to obtain a sm all list of messages from x t '; and on the other guarantees that the fraction of symbols erased by Calvin in xf'+l cannot suffice to confuse Bob between any two messages in the list he holds. Notice the duality between the parameter b of our upper bound and the parameter t* here. For our upper bound, we show that above rate C (no matter which code Alice and Bob use) there exists a threshold b for which Bob cannot uniquely decode based on x b , and Calvin has a sufficient remaining (erasure) budget to cause a decoding error in the remaining n -b symbols. In our lower bound, for any rate below C we suggest a coding scheme and show that there exists a threshold t* for which Bob can list decode based on the first t* received symbols, and that Calvin does not have sufficient (erasure) budget left to cause a decoding error in the remaining nt* symbols. As the rate for list decoding (in our lower bound) asymptotically (in n) approaches that of the b-blocklength q-ary symmetric channel (in our upper bound) we obtain tight results.
The ability to list decode is obtained using standard probabilistic arguments that take into account the block length t* and the number of erasures At' in x t *. The ability to uniquely decode from this list involves a more delicate analysis which uses the stochastic nature of our encoding, and the causality constraint of Calvin. In particular, we use the fact that the secret symbols used in the encoding of the prefix x t * are independent of those used for the suffix xf'+l. This independence is useful in separating the two decoding phases in that the casual adversary at time t* is acting with no knowledge whatsoever on the secret symbols used by Alice after time t*. This lack of knowledge sets the stage for the unique decoding phase.
We accommodate different potential values of t* by designing a stochastic encoding process in which different parts of each codeword x relies on independent secret symbols of Alice. Namely, we divide the coding process into chunks.
Each chunk is a random stochastic code of length ne for a small parameter e that uses independent randomness from Alice. The final code of Alice is a concatenation of all its chunks. Setting e small enough allows enough flexibility to allow Bob's decoder to "quantize" t* finely.
The encoder/decoder for the general pn-error p*n-erasure channel follows the same line of analysis as specified above for the erasure-only case, but with one major and significant difference. Bob does not know which unerased symbols in the received codeword were in error, and thus by studying the received word, Bob is not able to identify a location t* with the desired properties. To overcome this difficulty, we use an iterative decoder in which Bob starts with a sm all value of t and attempts to decode. As before the decoding process first list decodes using the first part of the received word and then uniquely decodes.
The list decoding is done according to a certain "guessed"
value Pt for the fraction of symbol errors in x t . Here, Pt is a carefully chosen function of t (also referred to as a "trajectory") that is known apriori to all parties. The trajectory Pt is chosen in a way that guarantees successful list-decoding for any location t for which Pt equals the traction of unerased symbols Pt actually changed by Calvin up to location t.
Specifically, Pt guarantees that Bob can obtain a "small" list of messages by list decoding up to position t, and to uniquely decode trom this list as the remaining corruption power of Calvin is limited. Analyzing these conditions gives a range of possible trajectories Pt (example in Figure 2 ). If At denotes the number of erasures Bob receives after t channel uses,
The value of Pt grows up to 1-~ , as t -At increases to q-1P n (1 -q~IP*). Establishing the existence of the trajectory Pt is via Claim III.1 below (whose proof is in [18] ) (E > 0 is a constant code-design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small). We then show that the iterative decoding of Bob is successful at threshold location t if indeed Pt :::::; Pt, otherwise, we show that Bob will realize that Pt 7' :-Pt since no message survives the unique decoding phase. In this case Bob increases t and again tries to decode. The crux 01' our analysis lies in our proof that eventually, regardless of Calvin's behavior, there is a value of t, denoted t*, for which Pt' is (approximately) Pt', and the unique decoding succeeds. This proof relies on Claim 111.3 below that shows that "good codes exist". To make this more precise, we first formally describe our codes. 3. Verify the codeword suffixes W.Lt. position t corresponding to messages in the list L through a consistency decoder that compares symbols in unerased positions. Specifically, consider the unerased symbols in the suffix (call the collection of these unerased symbols the "punctured" suffix) and the Hamming balls with radius equal to (n -t) ( q~ I -1~:2 )n p *2-At centered at the codeword suffix ("punctured" in positions corresponding to the erased positions of the received suffix) of each codeword corresponding to the messages in the list L. If the "punctured" suffix is outside all the balls, increase t by nB and goto Step (2). If the "punctured" suffix lies in exactly one of the balls, decode to the message in corresponding to the center of the ball. If the "punctured" suffix lies in more than one ball a decoding error is declared.
(If there are only erasures, i.e., p = 0, a simplified, but slightly different, decoding is used.)
The probability of error for a message rn is defined as the prob ability over Alice's private secrets SES that Bob decodes incorrectly. The probability of error for the code C is defined as the maximum of the probability of error over all messages rn EU. A rate R is said to be achievable if for every ~ > 0, ß > ° and every sufficiently large n there exists a code of block length n that allows Alice to communicate qn(R-ß) distinct messages to Bob with probability of error at most ~. The supremum over n of all achievable rates is the capa city C of the channel specified in Thm LI. Conditioned on the existence of good codes (which exist w.h.p., as stated in Claim III.3 whose proof is in [18] ), it
B. Existence of "good codes

